The problem: The risk team scores the customer payment API as Low. The score comes from a yearly review, done in the calm of a workshop. Meanwhile the security operations team (the SOC) sees password-guessing attacks against that same API every day. The SOC mentions it in a chat channel. The risk register never changes, and the board report says Low.
Words used here: an API is a door that lets one computer system talk to another. The risk register is the list of risks the company has noted, each with a score. The SOC is the team that watches alerts and deals with attacks. Password guessing means trying many passwords against one account until one works.
Think of last year’s almanac
A forecaster looks in a book written last year. It says, “March is dry.” A farmer standing in a field in March is soaked to the skin. The book is not lying. It was true on average, and it was written by someone careful. But it cannot see the sky today.
The risk register is the almanac. The SOC is the farmer. Both are needed, and only one of them can see what is happening now.
What it looks like at work
The yearly risk review scored the payment API Low, because it sits behind a login and the owner said it was well built. Since then, the SOC has seen about 2,000 failed sign-in attempts a day against it, from addresses around the world. These are example numbers. The analyst posts a note in the team chat and carries on with the day’s alerts.
The risk team never sees the chat. The register still says Low. The CISO builds the board report from the register. Three months later, an attacker gets in using a password reused from another leak, and the board asks why a risk with daily attacks was called Low.
- 11. Yearly reviewPayment API scored Low
- 22. Attacks beginAbout 2,000 failed sign-ins a day
- 33. A chat noteThe SOC posts it in team chat
- 44. Register unchangedBoard report still says Low
- 55. BreachA reused password gets in
Both teams have a fair point. The risk team scores on evidence gathered carefully, with the owner, and a yearly review is a reasonable rhythm. The SOC sees real attacks but each alert is one small signal, and they are busy. Nobody ignored anything on purpose. The two teams simply have no route between them.
You will notice it when:
- The risk register is updated once a year, whatever happens in between.
- The SOC says “we told them” and the risk team says “nobody told us.”
- Attack information lives in chat messages and not in tickets.
- The same system is Low in one report and “under attack” in another.
- The risk team has never read a SOC monthly summary.
What exactly needs fixing
The fix is not a second yearly review. It is a small, fast route for real attack evidence to reach the risk score, and a promise to look again within days. This card shows the whole problem on one page:
The payment API is scored Low while the SOC sees password-guessing attacks against it every day.
The yearly risk register, and the SOC’s team chat.
A system rated Low is breached after months of visible attacks.
- Wrong board picture
- Late reaction
- Register loses trust
- SOC stops reporting
- 11. Raise a flagOne short form when the SOC sees real attacks on a named system
- 22. Re-score in 5 daysThe risk team re-scores or writes down why not
- 33. Meet monthlyOne list: flags raised, scores changed or kept, and why
Who fixes it: SOC lead and risk lead
By when: form and promise live in 2 weeks
A blank copy of this card is in the Tools section.
Why it happens
- The risk register is a yearly snapshot. Nobody built a way to update it between reviews.
- SOC findings go into alerts and chat. Not into a form the risk team reads.
- The two teams have different goals. One protects today, the other plans for the year.
- No one is named to carry the news. Each team assumes the other will ask.
- A score feels final once it has been signed. Changing it needs a reason and a person.
What happens if you ignore it
The company makes decisions on a picture that is out of date.
- Real attacks are missed in planning, so no money goes to protect the target.
- The board is told Low and later learns attackers were trying every day.
- Auditors see a register that never moves and doubt the whole process.
- The SOC stops reporting up, because it seems to change nothing.
At a glance
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| How likely is it to hurt us? | Likely, wherever the register is updated yearly. |
| Worst case? | A system rated Low is breached after months of visible attacks. |
| What does it cost? | A wrong board picture, a late reaction, and trust in the register. |
| What if we wait? | The next review will still say Low. |
| What does the fix cost? | One short form and a monthly 30-minute meeting. |
How to fix it, step by step
Raise a flag, re-score within five days, then meet monthly.
- Create a “live evidence” flag. One short form the SOC fills in when it sees real attacks against a named system.
- Set what triggers it. For example: repeated attacks over a week, or any attack that gets near success.
- Send the flag to one named person in the risk team. Not to a chat channel.
- Promise a re-score within 5 working days. The risk team looks at the evidence and updates the rating, or writes why not.
- Tell the system owner. The owner may know why the attacks matter, or what already protects the system.
- Meet monthly for 30 minutes. One list: flags raised, scores changed, scores left alone and why.
- Show the change in the next board report. With a line: “rating changed because of live evidence.”
The picture shows the order: raise a flag, re-score within five days, then meet monthly. The five-day promise is what makes the flag worth filling in.
Who to bring in: The SOC lead (raises flags), the risk lead (re-scores), the system owner (adds what they know), and the CISO (sees the changes in the board report).
Tools and templates
Live evidence flag
| Field | Write here |
|---|---|
| System | The name of the system under attack |
| What the SOC sees | Plain words and numbers, for example failed sign-ins per day |
| Since when | The date it started |
| Current score | What the register says today |
| Raised by | Name and date |
| Re-score due | Five working days from the date raised |
Blank finding card
| Field | Write here |
|---|---|
| What is broken | One line, in plain words |
| Where it is | The system, team, or process |
| What could go wrong | In one sentence |
| What it costs us | Money, time, a failed audit, lost trust |
| The fix | The exact action |
| Who fixes it | One name or one team |
| By when | A date, not “soon” |
Email to start the talk
Subject: A way for live attacks to reach the risk register
Hi both. The SOC has seen daily attacks on the payment API, but the register still says Low and the board report uses that score. I would like us to try a one-page flag the SOC fills in when it sees real attacks, and a re-score within five working days. Can we meet for 30 minutes this week? I am not looking for who should have known. I am looking for a route that makes sure the register moves when the world does.
Field tip
If you see the same attack three days in a row, stop treating it as noise. Fill in the flag. It takes two minutes.
Words used in this chapter
- API: a door that lets one computer system talk to another.
- Risk register: the list of risks the company has noted, each with a score.
- SOC: the security operations team that watches alerts and deals with attacks.
- Password guessing: trying many passwords against one account until one works.
- Re-score: to look at a risk again and set a new rating.
- Live evidence: proof of something happening now, not at the last review.